One of the principle aims of the Working Families' Tax Credit in the UK was to increase the participation of single mothers. The literature to date concludes there was approximately a …ve-percentage-point increase in employment of single mothers. The di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology that is typically used compares single mother with single women without children.
Introduction
In October 1999, the Working Families'Tax Credit (WFTC) was introduced in the United Kingdom with the intention of "making work pay" for families with children. This so-called "in-work bene…t" aimed to encourage certain groups in the economy-single parents and low-income couples-to participate in the labor market. In general, WFTC aimed to alleviate poverty at the lower end of the wage distribution, reduce income inequality and redistribute income by reducing the dispersion of earnings.
The WFTC was a minimum-working-hours based credit for families with children, and although it was not an innovative policy, it was much more generous than its predecessor, Family Credit, and extended further up the wage distribution. Spending on WFTC totaled £ 6.3 billion in 2002/03 compared with only £ 2.3 billion under Family Credit in 1998/9. Eligibility for WFTC was contingent on four criteria: household members working a minimum of 16 hours a week; the presence of children;
"low" household income; and …nancial assets below £ 8,000. The magnitude and the popularity of this tax-credit policy induced a number of studies on the labor-supply impact of WFTC (see Brewer and Browne (2006) for an overview of the literature).
The overall conclusion was that the generosity of the in-work credit system was successful in inducing single mothers to increase their participation in the labor market by …ve percentage points. The labormarket impact of WFTC on single parents (particularly, single mothers) is important to understand as they were one of the biggest bene…ciaries of the tax-credit policy. The government targeted this particular group as it became apparent that there was a shift in the composition of the lowest decile of the income distribution from pensioners to families of working age, and single parents in particular (see Goodman (2001) ). Figure 1 highlights the di¤erences in income between di¤erent family types.
Moreover, by looking at the cross-country employment rates of single mothers in Figure 2 , it is clear 1 In October 1999, families with a net income below £ 92.90 a week recieved the maximum amount of WFTC, and it would then taper o¤ to 55 percent. 2 These …gures are taken from the "Working Families' Tax Credit Statistics," Inland Revenue Quarterly Enquiry (2003) that the UK has one of the lowest.
A common approach for analyzing the impact of tax-credit policies on the labor supply of single mothers (for example, Eissa and Leibman (1996) ) has been to use the di¤erences-in-di¤erences methodology. Using this approach, single women without children are used as a control group and compared, before and after the policy introduction, to single mothers (the treatment group). This technique relies on the assumption that the comparison group is a su¢ ciently close match and that the relative returns to covariates remain similar over time, such that after taking the di¤erences-indi¤erences, the remaining e¤ect can be considered as the impact of the policy alone on the treated group. However, it is quite likely that single women without children are not an appropriate control group since they are observably and (most likely) unobservably di¤erent. Moreover, in the case of the UK, the pattern of employment growth over time for single women without children has been very di¤erent from the patterns for those with children. Figure 3 plots the employment rates of single women without children and single mothers. 3 We can see that there has been an increasing trend in the employment rate of single mothers since the mid-1990s, while the level for single childless women has been high and has remained fairly ‡at over the same period. In particular, over the period 1996 to 1999 (the "pre-treatment" period), employment rates increase by 6.5 percent for single mothers and only 1.6 percent for single childless women. Given these patterns, we may also infer that the composition of single mothers has been changing over time, making a comparison between these two groups even more di¢ cult. From this, we may be concerned that the labor-supply estimates of the policy In addition to the overall employment e¤ects of WFTC, we may also be interested in the distribution of hours worked and the transitions into employment from various labor-market states. Since WFTC was contingent on working at least 16 hours a week, we may expect there to have been a spike 3 Our analysis stops in 2003, as WFTC was replaced by the Working Tax Credit.
after 1999 at the 16-hours point. In addition, since the policy o¤ered a bonus if the claimant worked 30 hours or more, we may expect some change here too. However, if we look at the hours distribution of single mothers in Figure 4a , the "post-treatment" (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) increases in hours worked beyond at the 16 hour point are very small but, more notably, continuous over the whole time period. The changes in hours worked can be seen more clearly in Figures 5a to 5c. While fewer single mothers worked 0-15 hours and more worked 16-29 hours, these patterns have occurred smoothly since the mid-1990s, with no spikes when WFTC was introduced. 4 The aim of this paper is three-fold: …rst, to address the concern of the suitability of the control group to see how the results change when we control for group-speci…c di¤erential trends; second, to see where (along the hours distribution) the changes in the employment of single mothers took place and from which labor-market state (working 0-15 hours, unemployment,or inactive); …nally, we look at the time-series movements of the relative rates of return of important covariates to employment-in particular, returns to the presence of children (i.e., the treatment variable) between 1993 and 2003.
Overall, when we allow for di¤erential trends, we …nd that the e¤ect of WFTC on employment falls to 1.7 percentage points, considerably lower than the literature's estimate of …ve percentage points.
We …nd that this e¤ect is borne solely by those working full-time (30 hours or more). In addition, we …nd that the policy change had no e¤ect on those who were inactive. The analysis on the covariates con…rms that there has been a continuous fall in the relative di¤erence between having children and not having children on the probability of entering into employment. The relative di¤erences in other important covariates, such as education, have also been changing over time.
These results o¤er valuable insight into two key issues: …rst, the e¤ectiveness of policy and second, the design of the policy. In particular, they imply that the increase in participation is overestimated using standard techniques. Moreover, the policy was not as well targeted as initially believed, given that any increase in employment was borne solely by those who work 30 or more hours, while those who were inactive were una¤ected by the policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of the tax-credit reform. Section 3 discusses the di¤erence-in-di¤erence methodology and describes initial concerns 4 See Table A1 , which shows more clearly the movements in the hours distribution over time.
with regard to both the treatment and control groups. In Section 4, we discuss the data and main descriptive statistics of the treatment and control groups. Section 5 we estimate the e¤ect of WFTC on employment and hours. In Section 6, we continue our evaluation of WFTC by looking at the movements in coe¢ cients over time. Section 7 discusses the implications of these results and tries to understand why we observed the increases in single mothers'employment rates before WFTC. Section 8 concludes.
The Structure of the WFTC Reform
In this section, we brie ‡y describe the Working Families'Tax Credit (WFTC) policy, introduced in the UK in October 1999.
Systems of support for families with dependent children in the UK have been in operation since the 1970s. Although there were some structural reforms over the years, the eligibility criteria have generally been based on a family income below a certain level, the presence of children and a low household savings rate. There were two distinctive di¤erences between its predecessor, Family Credit (FC), and WFTC. First, the WFTC was much more generous, exceeding the FC in four ways: an increase in the credit for children under age 11from £ 12.35 to £ 14.85 per week (per child); an increase in the threshold from £ 79 to £ 92.90 per week; a reduction in the taper from 70 percent to 55 percent and a childcare credit of 70 percent of actual childcare costs up to £ 150 per week. Figure 6 shows these relative changes. It can be seen that those who would gain the most were people who were just at the end of the taper under FC, as they were previously ineligible and were now eligible. In addition, those with a net income between £ 79 and £ 92.90 per week would move from being on the taper to receiving maximum support, and those who remain on the taper following the introduction of WFTC would see their withdrawal rate fall from 70 percent to 55 percent.
The second important di¤erence between Family Credit and WFTC was that the WFTC payment was made through the wage packet. This was an attractive move because it became more convenient to distribute and reduced the "welfare bene…t" stigma attached to the tax credit. In April 2000, the eligible claimant would claim the approximate tax credit from the Inland Revenue, which would work out the amount of tax credit payable. The Inland Revenue would then notify the relevant employer of the amount of tax credit to be paid, and the employer would pay the tax credit out of the tax and National Insurance contribution that they would otherwise have forwarded to the Inland Revenue.
3 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Estimation the majority of these single parents were women, our focus will be on single mothers. Figure 7 shows how WFTC changed the budget constraint of a single mother with one child. The reform unambiguously enhanced the probability of participation, as the …nancial returns to working more than 16 hours were greater after the reform. However, the complexity of the budget constraint and the interaction with other taxes and bene…ts imply that the overall impact of WFTC on the labor participation of single mothers is not entirely obvious. Blundell et al (2000) highlight that the increase in net income was small for those who worked fewer than 25 hours a week because of the interaction of WFTC and the Housing Bene…t. For higher levels of hours worked, the reduction in the WFTC taper increases the returns to working. For those already working, the labor supply response to the introduction of WFTC is unclear because the marginal tax rate was unambiguously reduced at all hours under the reform, though even with WFTC, it remained high (70 percent). This increased the price of non-market time, causing individuals to consume less non-market time and, therefore, to increase their hours of work (standard substitution e¤ect). The income e¤ect would be negative, however (assuming that non-market time is a normal good).
In Figure 8 , we see the evolution of employment rates among single mothers. Finally, because there were various tax and bene…ts reforms in the late 1990s that targeted single mothers, it is di¢ cult to say if these policies had more or less impact than WFTC did on the employment rate of single mothers. Gregg and Harkness (2003) discuss the introduction of other policies directed at the low-skilled workers and/or families with children, which also impacted the employment rates of single mothers. Moreover, given the timing of these policies, it is not possible to disentangle the e¤ects to see if the policies were jointly or separately signi…cant. In particular, the two other relevant policies, which targeted the entry of low-skilled groups into the labor market, were The main concern is that it is not clear that WFTC had the unambiguous e¤ect of increasing employment among single mothers. In particular, we need to be sure that the methodology used can control for sure complexities. In the analysis that follows, we will concentrate on the heterogeneity in the e¤ect on di¤erent parts of the hours distribution and the time-series changes in the employment of single mothers. However, trying to disentangle WFTC from other policies in the same period is di¢ cult, if not impossible.
The Control Group: Single Women without Children
The evaluation problem is to identify the e¤ect of WFTC on the employment of single mothers.
The simple idea behind the di¤erences-in-di¤erences (DID) estimator is to measure the growth in the outcome variable of the treated compared with the non-treated. The estimator compares the pre-program period, t 0 , and the post-program period, t 1 :
where Y T and Y C are the mean outcome for the treatment and control groups, respectively. However, an important assumption (relevant for our evaluation) that must hold is that the macro trends must have the same impact across the treatment and control groups. If there are di¤erential impacts, it must be that the two groups have some characteristics that distinguish them and make them react di¤erently to common macro shocks.
The control group must be as similar as possible to the treatment group in all dimensions other than that of eligibility. We can see that, while the employment of single women without children is high and has remained steady, the employment rate of lone mothers has been steadily increasing. Table 1 , which gives the descriptive statistics of these two groups in the period before the introduction of WFTC, reinforces this concern. One important distinction is that 22 percent of single women are highly quali…ed, compared with only six percent of single mothers, whereas only …ve percent of single women have no quali…cations, compared with 13 percent of single mothers 6 .
One possibility may be that low-educated single childless women would be a better comparison group for single mothers. However, a close inspection of the movements in the employment rates of that group reveals that the trends are very similar to that of all single childless women. In Figures A1 and A2, we plot the employment rates for low-educated single childless women against single mothers and low-educated lone mothers, respectively, and …nd little similarity in pre-WFTC trends.
In the analysis that follows, we look more closely at the di¤erential trends and, by close inspection of changes in covariates over time, at the sizable di¤erentials (that are changing over time) in observable characteristics between the treatment and control groups.
Data
The empirical investigation is done using the UK's Quarterly Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS is a repeated cross-section quarterly survey that contains information on individuals, households and families. We use data from 1993 quarter 1 (March-May) to 2003 quarter 1 (March-May), inclusive. We do not go beyond this period since in mid-2003, WFTC was replaced by a di¤erent tax-credit policy.
The dataset contains information on hours of work, labor market activity and a variety of control 6 More description of the descriptive statistics is given in Section 4.
variables needed for the analysis-in particular, the region of residence; age; highest quali…cation; ethnicity; the presence of children; the number of children; and the age of the youngest child in the household. The sample is restricted to single women between 18 and 60 years old. Full-time students, the sick/disabled or individuals in a government training program are omitted from the sample. The resulting sample size, after pooling all 41 quarters, is approximately 366,500. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for single women without children in the …rst column and for lone mothers in the second column. There are some clear di¤erences between the two groups.
Single mothers tend to be, on average, younger than single women without children (24.2 years versus 27.7 years), and they are more likely to be non-white (seven percent versus four percent). An important concern is that single mothers are less educated; a higher proportion have no quali…cations 5 Evaluation I
Basic Analysis
Following Eissa and Leibman (1996), we use a simple regression-based DID by estimating the following probit:
where emp is a dummy equal to one if a woman reported working at least one hour. The vector of X characteristics includes the region of residence, age (and higher order age squared and age cubed), highest quali…cation, ethnicity, the presence of children, the number of children and the age of the youngest child in the household. We include a real deseasonalised GDP series, t, to control for the general economic conditions, and we also include seasonal controls. The time trend and the individual characteristics will control for the observable di¤erences in the characteristics of the treatment and control groups that a¤ect the level of employment. The KID variable simply denotes a dummy variable that is equal to one if the individual is a lone mother and zero otherwise. Unobservable di¤erences are expected to be picked up here and we expect the coe¢ cient, 3 , be be negative if single mothers have a lower employment rate than single childless women, even after controlling for children. 7 The P ost1999 is a dummy equal to one for any quarter after Spring 2000. The coe¢ cient, These results are signi…cant at the one percent level and comply with the results in the literature, which average at …ve percentage points (see Brewer and Browne (2006) ).
The other covariates in this regression strongly suggest that having children is an important factor in determining the probability of working. For example, having three or more children reduces the probability of working by 39 percent relative to those with no children. In addition, having children under the age of …ve reduces the probability of working by 22 percent. Finally, the probability of working monotonically falls as the level of quali…cations falls, and non-whites are less likely to work.
However, the speci…cation used here makes two very big assumptions. First, it assumes that the coe¢ cient on the child dummy variable remains constant before the introduction of WFTC.
Second, it assumes that the coe¢ cients on other key covariates remain the same before and after the introduction of WFTC. In other words, we do not allow for any relative changes in the rates of return of covariates between single mothers and single women without children. In e¤ect, a violation of these two assumptions would lead to the interaction term (between the child dummy variable and the post WFTC period) picking up the e¤ect of these changes in the coe¢ cients and would bias our estimates of treatment e¤ect.
In the following analysis, we look carefully at both of these possibilities. In addition, we look closely to see who is a¤ected by the policy change. More speci…cally, we look to see where along the hours distribution the strongest impact of WFTC lies. We also look at the impact of WFTC on di¤erent labor-market states to see if single mothers are being drawn from inactivity and/or if they are increasing overall participation (with increases in unemployment).
Controlling for Di¤erential Trends
In Section 3.1, we looked at the time-series movements in the employment rates of single mothers relative to single childless women and it was clear that there were di¤erential trends in employment rates. The traditional DID analysis fails to allow for these di¤erences. Therefore, we extend our DID analysis to allow for the possibility of di¤erential trends between women with children and those without children:
We allow for di¤erential trends between our control and treatment groups by interacting the KID with the time trend, t. It can be seen that without controlling for this di¤erence, the treatment e¤ect would be biased upwards:
represents the average number of periods between the post-WFTC and pre-WFTC period observations.
The results presented in Table 3 show that once we control for di¤erential trends for women with children and women without children, the impact of WFTC on employment falls to 1.7-1.8 percentage points. All other covariates give a quantitatively similar picture as Table 2 , when we do not include the di¤erential trend.
These results suggest that the e¤ectiveness of WFTC seen in the previous section has been exaggerated. A large part of the increase in employment of single mothers estimated (4.2 percentage points), re ‡ects the changing trend in their attachment to the labor market. In Section 6, we look more closely at the e¤ect of the presence of children on employment over the period 1993 to 2003.
Hours Distribution E¤ect
Another important concern relates to our understanding of which part of the hours distribution was a¤ected by the introduction of WFTC. Given that there was a 16-hour minimum work requirement for WFTC, one would expect the impact of WFTC to be the greatest on those working at least 16
hours. In this section, we examine at the probability of working fewer than 16 hours (0-15 hours),of working part-time (16-29 hours), and of working full-time (30 hours or more).
We run the same speci…cation as we did for employment in Section 5.2 and report the results in Table 4 . The …rst column of each group of hours reports the results without controls for di¤erential trends. As one might expect, there are no signi…cant e¤ects on those working fewer than 16 hours (the hours threshold); there is an increase of 3.8 percentage points in the probability of working between 16 and 29 hours and an increase of 1.8 percentage points in the probability of working more than 30
hours.
When we control for the di¤erential trends, the only treatment e¤ect that remains signi…cant is on those working more than 30 hours. We …nd an e¤ect of 1.3 percentage points on working full-time, at the ten percent signi…cance level. This is a very interesting result, as it is consistent with the predictions laid out in Section 3.1, which reported that the net income increase from WFTC was small below 25 hours of work due to interactions of WFTC with other taxes and bene…ts.
These results question whether the policy was designed well. Given that the policy targeted those with no labor-market attachment, one would expect this group to be more attracted to working parttime. In addition, one might expect that those we observe working 30 hours were probably those in work before the introduction of WFTC and may have simply increased their number of hours of work.
Although this does not imply that the policy was unsuccessful, it does seem to suggest that the policy did not a¤ect the main target group-i.e., those with little attachment to the labor market. In the next section, we look to see whether WFTC increased employment by those previously inactive.
6 Evaluation II
Changes in Coe¢ cients over time
The results from the previous section raise questions relating to how the child (treatment) coe¢ cient changed between1993 and 2003. In conjunction with this, it is also important to look more closely at the movements of the other (relative) covariates over the same time period. By doing so we can increase our insight into exactly how the introduction of WFTC a¤ected employment.
Child Coe¢ cient
To observe how the relative employment probabilities for those with children versus no children changed between 1993 and 2003, we estimate the following equation for each year:
The movements in the coe¢ cient on the presence of children over the period 1993-2003, reported in Table 5 , show a closing gap between women with children and those without children. This is shown very clearly in Figure 9 , which plots the coe¢ cient. The initial gap in employment probability between single mothers and single women without children is -36 percent. The coe¢ cient starts falling in 1994 and then, after a small a blip in 1998, it continues to fall to -0.27. One may argue that this re ‡ects an anticipated WFTC e¤ect. However, there is no reason to believe that almost two years before the introduction, people would have reacted to the policy as it would mean giving up a number of entitled bene…ts. Another pressing concern is that there were increase in WFTC in 2001 and 2002, above the rate of in ‡ation, and yet the child coe¢ cient ‡attened in 2000. We discuss these issues in more detail in Section 7.
Other Covariates
To look at the changes in other important covariates, we estimate the following:
In Figures 10 to 12 (and Tables A2 to A4) , we look at the e¤ect of the age of children, the number of children and the relative returns to education between single mothers and other single women, respectively. First, in Figure 10 , when looking at the di¤erent ages of children, we …nd that the biggest increases are for those with children aged zero to …ve years. Although, there was continuous growth over the ten years, the biggest increase occurred between 1998 and 2000,but then stagnated.
Again, it is surprising that the impact occurred before the introduction of WFTC.
In Figure 11 , we look at the e¤ect of the number of children on employment. The coe¢ cient of having one, two or three (or more) children seems to be increasing over time. The largest spike, however, came from those with only one or two children. This may due to the fact that both WFTC and its predecessor, Family Credit, o¤er only small supplements per extra child in the household, reducing the incentive to work. This is true, in particular, if there are two or more children in the household under the age of …ve.
Finally, in Figure 12 , we look at the changes in the relative returns to quali…cations/education for single mothers versus other single women. By holding the highest-educated as the control group, there seems to have been some (relative) change between the di¤erent education group-in particular, between low-educated women with and without children-the gap seems to be closing from 1995/6. Changes in Coe¢ cients When we look at the change in the child coe¢ cient for each group of hours (0-15 hours, 16-29 hours and 30 or more hours), the patterns correspond well to the patterns seen in Figures 5a-5c . In particular, looking at Figure 13a , we see that, although the relative e¤ect of working 0-15 hours was higher for single mothers than for single childless women, the coe¢ cient fell after 1995 and again after 2000. Figure 13b shows that e¤ect of being a lone mother on working between 16 and 29 hours is always relatively higher than for single childless women; however, this was a continuously growing pattern, with no acceleration in October 1999. Finally, Figure 13c looks at the change in the child dummy on working more than 30 hours. Here the pattern seems quite similar to the overall employment pattern in Figure 10 . We can see that, although single childless women are always more likely to work full-time, the relative di¤erence (after 1995) fell and, after 1998, the gap closed signi…cantly. However, after 2001, the gap began to widen again. If the increase in the probability that single mothers would work more than 30 hours was due to WFTC, one may question its long-term e¤ectiveness.
Hours of Work

Labor-Market States
In Table 6 we look at the e¤ect of WFTC on entering other labor-market states. The results imply that when we control for trends, the probability of entering unemployment falls 1.7 percentage points.
One may interpret this result in many ways. On the one hand, we would expect WFTC to have increased all labor-market participation. Thus, it would increase not only employment, but, given labor-market friction, also job search. On the other hand, we may expect unemployment to have fallen because people were accepting job o¤ers less reluctantly and/or searching with more intensity for a job.
When looking at the e¤ect of WFTC on inactivity, there seemed to be no signi…cant e¤ect. This is very interesting, as it suggests that women who entered the workforce did not come from inactivity but from unemployment, or that they were already employed and now simply increasing the number of hours worked. 
Changes in Coe¢ cients
Why did the Child Coe¢ cient Increase?
We have shown that over the period 1993 to 1999, before the introduction of WFTC, the employment rate of single mothers increased by 7.8 percent and that the relative employment probability of single mothers to single childless women, ceteris paribus, increased from -0.38 to -0.27 over the same period.
It is important to understand why we observe this increasing trend and to ask if this trend would have continued in the absence of WFTC.
By 1992, the number of single mothers had increased …vefold since the 1970s, to just under 500,000.
However, some of this increase related to changes in attitude. For example, in 1971, a third of couples who conceived outside marriage then had a "shot-gun" wedding, whereas in 1991, fewer than one in ten did so. Moreover, for teenagers who conceived outside marriage, almost one half married in 1971 compared with only one in 20 in 1991 (see Burghes (1995) ). Other changes included that there were fewer single mothers in their teens in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Overall, compositional changes and changes in attitudes towards single mothers may explain some of the observed changes in employment.
One argument proposed to explain the increasing trend in employment rates for single mothers was that WFTC was anticipated. In its March 1998 Budget speech, the New Labour Government announced the introduction of WFTC and other reforms targeted to "make work pay" for low-income families with children. However, there are three important reasons to question the plausibility that single mothers would react to this announcement, which came almost two years prior to the actual policy change. First, we observe increases in employment for single mothers before 1998. Secondly, there were smaller …nancial incentives (and, most likely, income losses) to enter the labor market before the introduction of WFTC. Finally, there were other policy changes between 1998 and 1999 that a¤ected lone mothers. We will discuss each separately.
First, there have been a huge number of polices over the last two decades intended to attract single mothers and, more generally, women and/or the low-skilled, into employment. These ranged from the introduction of the Equal Pay Legislation in 1970 to the increased ‡exibility in the labor market, which promoted part-time work. In addition, the improved nature and quality of childcare also promoted work among this group of women. Moreover, the 1994 change to Family Credit, which made it more generous and introduced a bonus amount for working 30 hours or more, also increased participation (See Duncan (1996) ). All of these changes took place before 1998. In their qualitative analysis, the authors observed a positive orientation towards work among single mothers and discovered that most women had worked (at least for some time) since they …rst had children. The main reasons given for not working were related to childcare (because of the marginal nature of the work they undertook: short-term, low-paid, with unsocial hours) and the loss of bene…ts, neither of which was addressed until after WFTC was introduced. (and £ 150 for two children). None of these additional bene…ts was available until after October 1999.
It is important to point out that, although WFTC was more active towards "making work pay," the interactions with other bene…ts, which strongly o¤set the e¤ectiveness of the increased generosity of WFTC, meant that most of the gain were concentrated in the middle or top of the hours distribution for single-parent households. For example, the Housing Bene…t is computed after WFTC, and so WFTC is counted as income in determining the Housing Bene…t entitlement, and hence, overall income. The results in this paper highlight this e¤ect.
Third, the introduction of the New Deal for Lone Parents in 1998 and the National Minimum Wage in 1999, which targeted low-income people and, in particular, families with children, implies that they played an important role in increasing employment amongst this group in the pre-WFTC period.
Thus, it was not the anticipation of WFTC that increased employment after 1998, but a reaction to the range of policies, that existed around that time. It is of critical importance to encapsulate these policies into the analysis to avoid overestimating the true e¤ect of WFTC. With the exception of Gregg and Harkness (2003), the literature discounts the importance of these policies and attribute any post-1998 increase in employment to WFTC.
Finally, it is important to question whether the increase in employment observed before October 1999 would have continued in the absence of WFTC. Given the interaction of di¤erent policy introductions, the e¤ect of WFTC is not easy to disentangle, making this a tough question to answer. There were, however, increases in the generosity of WFTC between 2000 and 2002 and changes in income tax and National Insurance rules (such that a ten percent income tax band was introduced and the two percent National Insurance entry fee was abolished), which meant that there should have been improved incentives for part-time workers and low-earning workers. However, we observe that over that period, employment for single mothers ‡attened and the child coe¢ cient was stable. This may be because WFTC lacked e¤ectiveness, or it may be that the e¤ects were dampened by the increase in Income Support over the same period and the loss of the Housing Bene…t.
Overall, although WFTC and even, perhaps, its anticipation seems to have had some e¤ect on the employment of single mothers, the e¤ects have been exaggerated because the lack of attention given to other policies of the 1990s and, perhaps, di¤erential contemporaneous shocks between people with and without children. In addition, we are interested not only in whether WFTC increased employment, but also in whether the government succeeded in increasing the participation and hours of work of their target group. By looking at the changes in the hours distribution and the labor-market states, it is not clear that those with the least labor-market attachment were encouraged into the labor market.
Conclusion
The increased use of tax credits as a method of "in work bene…ts" has raised a great deal of popular interest in the UK and in many other countries where they have been initiated. In particular, the success of the program was said to lie mainly in the increase in the employment of single parents.
This paper looks closely at the e¤ectiveness of WFTC in increasing employment, hours of work and movements from di¤erent labor-market states. The evidence suggests that once we control for the di¤erential trends in employment between lone mothers and single childless women, who are used as the control group, the employment e¤ect from WFTC fell considerably. This is con…rmed when we look at the movements of the coe¢ cients over time. Moreover, we …nd that the policy did not induce people from outside of the labor market (i.e. from inactivity)-the main target group. Instead, we …nd that any e¤ect of WFTC is borne solely by those working 30 hours or more. NOTES: We also control for region of residence, age squared and age cubed. The omitted comparison categories are: No Children, High Qualification, Youngest Child 12-16, White. The coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) are reported. ** represents significance at the 1% level, * represents significance at the 5% level and + represents significance at the 10% level. 
